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Abstract The paper makes a case for there being causation in the form of causal
properties or causal structures in the domain of fundamental physics. That case is
built in the first place on an interpretation of quantum theory in terms of state re-
ductions so that there really are both entangled states and classical properties, GRW
being the most elaborate physical proposal for such an interpretation. I then argue
that the interpretation that goes back to Everett can also be read in a causal manner,
the splitting of the world being conceivable as a causal process. Finally, I mention
that the way in which general relativity theory conceives the metrical field opens up
the way for a causal conception of the metrical properties as well.
Keywords Causal properties · Classical properties · Direction of time ·
Dispositions · Entanglement · Everett · GRW · Measurement problem · Metaphysics
of science · Metrical field · Physical structures · Propensities · Quantum mechanics ·
Spontaneous localizations · State reductions
1 Introduction
Peter Mittelstaedt and I taught a course together at the University of Cologne in the
winter term 2001/02, that course being centred on philosophical theories of causa-
tion. He repeatedly asked me what the physical foundations of causation were, and I
was unable to answer that question at the time. In this paper, I would like to sketch
out the way in which I tend to answer this question today (without expecting Peter
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Mittelstaedt to agree with that answer). I endorse a realist view of causation, claiming
that causation is a fundamental physical feature, more precisely that the fundamental
physical properties or structures are causal properties or structures. This is a minority
view, being opposed to the mainstream view rooted in empiricism according to which
causation is not a fundamental feature of the world.
The latter view has been forcefully set out by Bertrand Russell [50] in a famous
paper in which he claims that a realist attitude to causation is not compatible with
modern physics. In the contemporary discussion, notably John Norton [42, 43] has
put forward such a view. Of course, Russell, Norton and others are right in claiming
that there is no question of an a priori principle of causation to be imposed upon
physics. A case for causation in physics can only be made by considering the inter-
pretation of the fundamental physical theories (see also the discussion between Frisch
[25, 26] and Norton [44]). In this vein, I shall go into the interpretation of quantum
physics (Sect. 2), explaining how the view of causation as a fundamental physical fea-
ture fits well into the interpretation of quantum physics in terms of state reductions,
GRW being the most prominent example of such an interpretation (Sect. 3). Nonethe-
less, this view is also compatible with the Everett interpretation (Sect. 4). Finally, I
will briefly mention the interpretation of general relativity (Sect. 5) and in conclusion
sum up the arguments for taking causation to be anchored in physics (Sect. 6).
2 The Measurement Problem in Quantum Physics
Quantum theory is one of the two fundamental physical theories, general relativity
theory being the other one. Notably the application of quantum theory to cosmol-
ogy and the search for a quantum theory of gravity, which sets out to unify quantum
field theory and general relativity theory, make clear that quantum theory is not a the-
ory about measurement—that is, not a theory about the behaviour of microphysical
objects relative to measurement devices—, but a candidate for a fundamental and uni-
versal theory of nature. The universal character of quantum theory is pointed out by
Peter Mittelstaedt [40] in his by now classical book on the interpretation of quantum
mechanics and the measurement process. A fundamental theory is one whose laws
and explanations do not depend on any other theories, and a universal theory is one
whose laws apply to everything that there is in the world. Thus, for instance, statisti-
cal mechanics is not a fundamental theory, since its laws and explanations depend on
laws and explanations that apply to single systems.
The upshot of these developments is that in today’s philosophy of science, it is
clear that quantum theory as such does not yield any reason to abandon scientific
realism. Notably following the debate about Bell’s theorem and the subsequent ex-
periments, it is evident that quantum theory forces us to change our vision of nature,
that is, our Naturphilosophie, but that as such it does not throw the presupposition
that science tells us something about the constitution of nature into question (for an
assessment, see especially the papers in Cushing and McMullin [14] and Redhead
[47], in particular Chap. 3).
Nonetheless, the standard textbook presentation of quantum mechanics still ac-
cords measurement a prominent role, whereas, for instance, in the standard textbook
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presentation of general relativity theory, no such stress is laid on measurement. The
standard textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, going back to von Neumann
[59, Chap. VI], suggests that when a measurement occurs, the dynamics of quantum
systems as described by the Schrödinger equation is no longer valid and one has to
switch to another dynamics, which simply consists in the postulate that when a mea-
surement happens, the measured quantum system adopts a definite numerical value
of the measured property. The reason for this sudden switch to another dynamics
is that according to the Schrödinger dynamics, whenever one system interacts with
another system, and be it the interaction of a microscopic quantum system with a
macroscopic measurement device, the states of the two systems become entangled.
However, definite numerical values are observed as measurement outcomes, and a
measurement apparatus is in a state in which it indicates a definite numerical value if
and only if the measured quantum system is in a state in which it possesses a definite
numerical value of the measured property.
Although not unmotivated, von Neumann’s proposal is completely ad hoc. Mea-
surement processes and devices are not natural kinds, but scientists employ various
physical systems as measurement devices if they suit their interests. It is not possible
to give a precise physical definition of a measurement process and a measurement
apparatus, since there is no physical difference that distinguishes a measurement
process from other physical interactions. Measurement devices are an invention of
human beings that occurs late in cosmic evolution and that presupposes the existence
of macroscopic systems that are not subject to quantum entanglement. Taking cos-
mology into account, it is evident that there have been processes of the dissolution
of quantum entanglement (state reductions) in cosmic evolution independently of hu-
mans for humans to be able to use certain physical systems as measurement devices.
Such processes were the basis on which classical physical systems such as molecules,
organisms and finally humans developed. The measurement problem thus is not about
measurement in particular. It is a placeholder for the general problem how to under-
stand the transition from quantum systems in entangled states to systems that possess
classical properties. It is this problem that the thought experiment of Schrödinger’s
cat highlights: one can countenance atoms being in superposed and entangled states,
but not cats.
This is a real problem for both physicists and philosophers concerned with the
metaphysics of science, since there is no established physical fact that one can cite
as a solution to this problem. This lack of an established physical fact also is the rea-
son why the standard textbook presentation of quantum mechanics still resorts to the
unsatisfactory dualism of two dynamics that goes back to von Neumann. There has
of course been physical progress since the days of von Neumann, but no definitive
physical solution to the measurement problem. Decoherence is such an established
physical fact, but it changes nothing as regards quantum entanglement: applied to
measurement, the state of the quantum object and the measurement apparatus still
is an entangled one (an improper mixture, to use the term introduced by d’Espagnat
[15], Chap. 6.3), and not a product state (a proper mixture) (see e.g. Adler [1] and
Schlosshauer [51]). It is obvious why decoherence cannot dissolve entanglement,
since decoherence takes place entirely within the Schrödinger dynamics. Decoher-
ence at most shows why entanglement is not accessible to a local observer, but cannot
provide for its reduction.
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3 GRW: The Idea of a Unified Dynamics, and Causation
This situation is the motivation for trying to do better than von Neumann did. There
is evidence that there is quantum entanglement, as highlighted by the Bell-type ex-
periments, and there is evidence that there are classical properties. The ontologically
most conservative solution to the measurement problem consists in searching for a
unified dynamics that does justice to both entanglement in the quantum domain and
to classical properties when it comes to macroscopic objects. Such a dynamics, how-
ever, can be achieved only by amending the Schrödinger dynamics, more precisely
by breaking its linearity.
The only elaborate physical proposal for a unified dynamics that accepts both the
existence of quantum entanglement and provides for the transition to classical proper-
ties is the one going back to Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [28] (GRW) (forerunners of
this proposal include notably Pearle [45] and Gisin [29]). GRW add a stochastic term
to the linear Schrödinger equation such that for an isolated, non-massless microscopic
quantum system whose wave function (state vector) has a certain spatial spread that
stochastic term indicates a very low probability for spontaneous localization—that
is, for a state reduction that ends up in a spontaneous adoption of a rather definite
position. It will on average take 1016 seconds for such an isolated system to undergo
a spontaneous localization. By contrast, when one considers a macroscopic system
that is composed of a large number of microscopic quantum systems, such a sys-
tem will adopt a definite position in an extremely short time. Due to entanglement,
any spontaneous localization of one of the microscopic systems composing a macro-
scopic system implies the spontaneous localization of all the others and thus of the
macroscopic system as a whole (see Ghirardi [27], Chaps. 16.8 and 17, for an elabo-
rate presentation). It is of course not the task of a philosopher to assess the physical
quality of the proposal of GRW. I consider this proposal since it is hitherto the only
elaborate physical theory of a dynamics of state reductions.
The stochastic term that GRW add to the Schrödinger equation and that results in
an indeterministic dynamics is not a hidden variable. What GRW set out to do is to
integrate von Neumann’s state reduction postulate in the Schrödinger dynamics in or-
der to achieve a unified dynamics. The spontaneous localizations occur independently
of measurement processes. Measurement simply is one interaction among others that
does not call for a special treatment in the GRW version of quantum mechanics. GRW
thereby is able to account for the cosmic evolution that leads from quantum systems
to classical systems and finally organisms, including humans and their technologi-
cal inventions. The gain thus is unification: provided that one grants that both the
quantum and the classical domain exist, GRW set out to tell us, in contrast to von
Neumann’s postulate, how both these domains hang together.
However, to be precise, the GRW amendment to the Schrödinger equation does
not result in a microscopic quantum system adopting exactly one definite numerical
value of position (apart from the mathematical fact that, in classical as well as in
quantum mechanics, position has a continuous spectrum of values so that its value can
never be exactly one number). The stochastic term that GRW add to the Schrödinger
equation amounts to the wave function being centred around a peak as a result of a
spontaneous localization of the system. But that peak is not a point, and, moreover,
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the wave function is not zero outside that peak. This fact is known as the problem of
the tails of Schrödinger’s cat (the tails problem for short).
According to the standard solution to this problem that goes back to Albert and
Loewer [4], the requirement of there being precise numerical values (in other words,
the eigenstate-eigenvalue link) has to be abandoned. Thus, the price that we have
to pay for this solution—and hence for having a unified dynamics at our disposal—
is that the notion of microscopic localization becomes somewhat vague and that, in
general, we have to countenance values that are objectively there, but slightly vague
or fuzzy. (The discussion on the tails objection focused in recent years on the counting
anomaly raised by P. Lewis [35] and Clifton and Monton [13]; but the reply to that
objection by Bassi and Ghirardi [7] and [8] seems to me to be entirely convincing;
see also Wallace [60], end of Sect. 3.)
Although the original proposal of GRW looks like an ontology of particles, quan-
tum systems being particles each of which has a certain probability of undergoing a
process of spontaneous localization, GRW are not committed to an ontology of parti-
cles. In contrast to Bohm’s quantum theory, there is nothing like particles possessing
always a definite position and thus a definite trajectory in GRW. There are processes
of spontaneous localization, but these are processes of state reduction of superposed
or entangled states, and quantum systems in these latter states do not possess a defi-
nite localization and hence no definite trajectory. Since there is interaction, the states
that are to be considered as the basis for spontaneous localizations are not superposed
states of isolated quantum systems, but entangled states that involve a lot of quantum
systems.
Quantum entanglement is the main motivation for a position that is known as ontic
structural realism and that is one of the main currents in contemporary metaphysics
of science, going beyond an ontology of particles (see notably Ladyman [32], French
and Ladyman [23], Esfeld [19]). A physical structure can be conceived as a network
of concrete physical relations—such as the relations of quantum entanglement—
among objects that are nothing but what stands in these relations. There is no need for
structural realism to claim that there are no objects at all and thus no need to change
standard first order logic, which quantifies over objects (see the so-called moderate
structural realism of Esfeld and Lam [21] in contrast to French and Ladyman [23];
but see also the more moderate formulations in Ladyman and Ross [33], Chaps. 2
to 5). The point is that these objects do not possess any identity independently of the
relations in which they stand. There hence are no intrinsic properties on which these
relations could supervene, and the objects cannot be individual particles.
Let us assume that ontic structural realism is a metaphysical framework that fits
quantum entanglement, pointing out the appropriate way in which quantum entan-
glement goes beyond an ontology of particles. GRW have the means to take quantum
entanglement, thus conceived, into account. Nothing hinders one to conceptually de-
velop GRW in such a way that the disposition for spontaneous localization is regarded
as being inherent to the entangled state as such, instead of being an intrinsic property
of individual quantum particles. In other words, the probability for an entangled state
to undergo a state reduction in the form of the spontaneous localization of the objects
that stand in the relations of entanglement in question depends on the number of ob-
jects that the entangled state includes. The result of this interpretative move is exactly
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what GRW claim, namely that a macroscopic system consisting of a great number of
quantum systems that are entangled with each other adopts a rather precise position
in physical space in the form of a spontaneous localization of these quantum systems
in an extremely short time, whereas in the case of there being only a few quantum
systems that are entangled with each other, the probability for the whole system to
adopt a precise position in physical space is very low. Hence, in developing the on-
tology of GRW, one can waive a commitment to quantum systems being individual
particles.
That move paves the way for extending GRW to quantum field theory, including
quantum gravity, as well. There are of course non-local correlations in GRW, includ-
ing correlations between space-like separated events of spontaneous localization, but
there is no non-local interaction. GRW violate the condition of outcome indepen-
dence in the derivation of the Bell inequalities, but not the condition of parameter
independence. (Mittelstaedt [41] takes GRW to explain these non-local correlations
in terms of the process resulting in spontaneous localization being their common
cause.)
Furthermore, following Bell [9], one can conceive GRW in such a way that the re-
duction of entangled states results in flashes centred around space-time points. Thus
conceived, GRW are not committed to there being a globally privileged reference
frame or coordinate system, as has been shown by Tumulka [58] (see also Maudlin
[38] for a discussion). The flash version of GRW hence is compatible with special
as well as general relativity. It can be set out in such a manner that, for instance, the
question of the temporal order of the two measurements in a Bell-type experiment
on a pair of spin 1/2 systems in the singlet state separated by a space-like interval
has no significance at all. Although the work of Tumulka (2006) is only a first step,
there is thus reason to hope that it will eventually turn out to be possible to develop
an interpretation of quantum theory that acknowledges processes of state reduction
existing in nature without having to maintain that there is a globally privileged refer-
ence frame or coordinate system, imposing an objective temporal order on space-like
separated events.
Taking state reductions seriously, as do GRW, has important ontological conse-
quences, and it is here that causation comes in. According to GRW, definite numer-
ical values of state-dependent properties exist, but only as a result of the dissolution
of entanglement, that is, as a result of state reductions in the form of spontaneous
localizations. The state reductions lead to one definite numerical value existing at the
exclusion of the other possible definite numerical values. An entangled state there-
fore is best conceived as the disposition to bring about definite numerical values of
state-dependent properties through state-reduction—in other words, the disposition
for spontaneous localization. That disposition is itself a real and actual property, not
a mere potency.
Treating entanglement as a disposition that is a real and actual property fits into
what is known as the causal theory of properties (see notably Shoemaker [52] and
Bird [10]). According to this theory, insofar as properties are certain qualities, they
are powers to bring about certain effects. Thus, insofar as entangled states are certain
real and actual, qualitative physical states, they are the power to bring about definite
numerical values through spontaneous localization—or, in short, the power to pro-
duce spontaneous localizations. In contrast to macroscopic dispositions such as the
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disposition of water to dissolve sugar, the power that entangled quantum states are
does not depend on outside triggering conditions for its manifestation. That is the
point of the disposition being one for spontaneous localization.
There is no need for causal properties to be intrinsic properties of individual par-
ticles. Nothing hinders one to apply the causal theory of properties to physical struc-
tures such as the structures of entanglement: insofar as entanglement is a network
of concrete physical relations, that network is the power to bring about spontaneous
localizations such that there are definite numerical values that are correlated in a spe-
cific manner (see Esfeld [20] for details). Hence, as regards entanglement, there are
only possible definite numerical values each of which can become actual at the exclu-
sion of the other ones. However, this is not a mere potency, but a really existing power
to bring about such values (for more details about quantum dispositions in GRW and
the arguments in the following four paragraphs, see Dorato and Esfeld [17]).
Introducing dispositions and thus causation in this manner in the interpretation of
quantum physics yields a clear answer to the question what the properties of quantum
objects are if there are no properties with definite numerical values. Suggesting that
there are no properties at all if there are no definite numerical values does not make
sense, since a physical system cannot exist without possessing physical properties,
and properties with definite numerical values cannot develop out of nothing. And
saying that there simply is the wave function or state vector begs the question, since
the wave function or state vector is a mathematical tool to represent physical reality,
but not itself physical reality. In other words, one has to spell out an account of what
the physical reality as represented by the wave function or state vector is. Conceiv-
ing the ontology of GRW in terms of dispositions provides for such an account: the
properties that there are in entangled states when there are no definite values are dis-
positions to develop such values, and the causal theory of properties makes clear how
such dispositions can be real and actual properties.
Conceiving entangled states as dispositions in the form of causal powers implies a
further commitment: taking probabilities into account, we have to say that the powers
that the entangled states are amount to propensities, that is, dispositions that have a
certain quantifiable strength for spontaneous manifestation in a certain manner, that
is, producing a certain numerical value at the exclusion of other values. That strength
is expressed in the form of probabilities. In other words, in this framework, we are
committed to applying the propensity theory of probabilities to the quantum prob-
abilities. The advantage of doing so is that we get the account of probabilities that
is needed for the quantum probabilities, namely objective single case probabilities.
Quantum probabilities clearly apply to single cases, and they are objective probabil-
ities, concerning features of the quantum domain itself, instead of our knowledge.
The propensity view of probabilities meets these demands, since it takes probabilities
to be anchored in dispositions that have a certain quantifiable strength to manifest
themselves spontaneously in a certain manner.
Frigg and Hoefer [24], by contrast, regard the GRW probabilities as fitting into a
Humean theory of probabilities as well. However, a Humean theory of probabilities,
such as the one of David Lewis [34], has to resort to the parameters of simplicity
and strength and the best balance between them. But these are epistemic parameters.
It is therefore doubtful whether such a theory can really yield objective, single case
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probabilities. Mittelstaedt ([39], in particular pp. 168–170) does not countenance the
propensity interpretation of quantum probabilities either, although he endorses an
individualistic interpretation of quantum mechanics by contrast to an ensemble inter-
pretation. However, in this case, it seems logical to apply probabilities to single cases
as well, and the only clear way of doing so is by conceiving them as propensities.
The propensity interpretation of quantum probabilities has been refined considerably
since it had first been introduced notably by Popper [46] (see in particular the papers
of Suárez [55, 56] and [57] as well as Dorato [16]).
Finally, there is a further feature that an interpretation of quantum theory that ac-
knowledges state reductions has to include and that becomes intelligible in the frame-
work of the causal theory of properties. Amending the Schrödinger equation with a
stochastic term as GRW do in order to account for state reductions has not only the
consequence that the dynamics is indeterministic, but also that it is not time-reversal
invariant. In other words, the GRW equation is a candidate for a fundamental law
of nature that is not time-reversal invariant. Quantum systems that have undergone
a spontaneous localization may of course again enter into entangled states, but con-
ceiving a process that runs from a spontaneous localization back to the entangled state
that existed before that localization would contradict the GRW law, more precisely
the stochastic term that GRW add to the Schrödinger equation. Again, that feature of
GRW has an important advantage: it provides for an explanation of the direction of
time. As Albert [2, Chap. 7] has shown, the GRW processes of spontaneous local-
ization are not only irreversible, thus singling out a direction of time, but they can
also serve as the origin of all time-asymmetric phenomena. Conceiving entangled
states in terms of dispositions (causal powers) leads to an explanation of this lack of
time-reversal invariance: the production of an effect by a cause is the paradigmatic
example of an irreversible process. Consequently, if spontaneous localization is the
manifestation of a disposition, it is evident why processes of state reduction can in
principle not be reversed and why they are the foundation of the direction of time.
In other words, if causation is a feature of the domain of fundamental physics, there
being causal properties in that domain, then the dynamics describing that domain
cannot be time-reversal invariant, since the production of an effect by a cause is not
a time-reversal invariant process.
To sum up, there are arguments that are independent of the issue of causation in
fundamental physics and that speak in favour of searching for a unified dynamics in
the interpretation of quantum physics, as do GRW. The main argument is that in do-
ing so, one does justice to both the existence of entanglement in the quantum domain
and to the existence of classical properties when it comes to macroscopic objects.
Within the framework of a unified dynamics, nothing hinders one from maintaining
that quantum theory provides for a complete description of the quantum domain—
in other words, the wave function (state vector) is such a complete description, and
there is no need to supplement this description with the assumption of so-called hid-
den variables (as is done in Bohm’s theory of the quantum domain, which in addition
to the description by the wave function assumes that quantum systems are individual
particles, possessing always a definite numerical value of position and thus a definite
trajectory in space-time). Furthermore, in acknowledging the real existence of classi-
cal properties, there then is no reason to commit oneself to an inflationary ontology
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of the world splitting itself up in infinitely many branches of the universe as a result
of measurements (or simply as a result of decoherence), since no state reductions
are admitted (as according to the interpretation going back to Everett [22]). Having
thus based an interpretation of quantum physics in terms of a unified dynamics on
arguments that are independent of the issue of causation in physics, the ontological
commitments of that interpretation then lead us, as spelled out in this section, to ac-
knowledging causation in the form of dispositions and thus causal properties as a
fundamental physical feature.
4 The Everett Interpretation and Causation
Although the interpretation of quantum physics that admits state reductions is the
locus classicus for anchoring dispositions and thus causation in the domain of fun-
damental physics, making a case for causation in quantum physics is not necessarily
tied to an interpretation of quantum physics in terms of entangled states being dis-
positions for developing into classical properties. Causation can be situated within
the other two main contenders in the interpretation of quantum physics as well. As
regards Bohm’s theory, it seems possible to propose a causal reading of the quantum
potential, it being a causal structure that moves the particles around. Let us, how-
ever, consider the Everett interpretation rather than Bohm’s interpretation in a little
more detail, since it enables us to further pursue the issue of causation in fundamental
physics.
The Everett interpretation takes the Schrödinger dynamics to be the complete dy-
namics of quantum systems. It does not recognize state reductions, and it does hence
not recognize the real existence of classical properties. One is in this case committed
to regarding the quantum structures of entanglement as being universal: they encom-
pass all the objects in the world and all their dynamical properties, including all the
macroscopic objects and in the last resort also the consciousness of observers (the last
consequence has first been highlighted by Albert and Loewer [3] and Lockwood [37],
Chaps. 12 and 13, in the so called many minds interpretation of quantum theory).
According to the way in which this interpretation is usually set out, the world splits
into infinitely many branches that exist in parallel so that all the objects in the world
including the consciousness of each observer are infinitely many times duplicated,
existing in infinitely many branches of the universe, and having one of the possible
dynamical values of their properties in each of these branches. In other words, all the
possible definite numerical values of a property that enter into the superpositions and
entanglement do in fact exist, but distributed among infinitely many branches of the
universe.
The observation of classical properties is usually accounted for in this framework
in the following manner: the structures of entanglement develop into a process that is
known as decoherence. Decoherence is a process leading in a very short time to the
different terms of an entangled state no longer interfering with each other. A local
observer who stands within such a structure of entanglement therefore has in her
observations no access to the other terms of the superposition, which exist in other
branches of the universe. In a nutshell, the world appears classically to us, because,
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being local observers, we cannot observe the structures of entanglement as a whole
(which nevertheless really exist) (see Wallace [60, Sect. 4]), for a detailed assessment
of the contemporary discussion about the interpretation of quantum theory that goes
back to Everett).
It is in this interpretative framework also possible to consider the quantum struc-
tures of entanglement as causal structures. This interpretation has to answer the fol-
lowing question: What does the physical reality of the quantum structures of entan-
glement consist in, so that these structures can develop through decoherence into
a splitting of the world in infinitely many branches, which do not interfere with
each other and which contain definite numerical values of quantum properties each?
A clear answer to this question that recognizes the physical reality of the structures
of quantum entanglement without confusing that physical reality with the mathemat-
ical reality of the state vector (wave function) consists in saying the following: the
quantum structures of entanglement are causal structures, being the power or disposi-
tion to produce through decoherence infinitely many branches of the universe, which
do not interfere with one another. On this reading, decoherence is a causal process,
consisting in the manifestation of causal structures in the form of the structures of
entanglement. In order to vindicate this reading, one would have, however, to show
how decoherence can be conceived as an irreversible process, although decoherence
is situated entirely within the Schrödinger dynamics.
Let us pursue the crucial point one step further: one cannot content oneself with
the claim that one should take the quantum wave function (state vector) seriously,
although that claim is of course well taken. The quantum state vector is a mathemat-
ical structure, living in configuration space and representing physical reality, but it
is not itself physical reality. In an interpretation of a physical theory, one therefore
has to answer the question what the physical reality as represented by a mathematical
structure (such as the wave function or state vector in configuration space) amounts
to. The answer to this question cannot consist in saying that what is physically real is
defined by its position in four-dimensional space-time, since entangled states do not
possess a definite localization and are independent of spatio-temporal distances. One
obtains a forceful answer to this question by employing a causal criterion of reality:
real physical structures distinguish themselves from mathematical structures in that
they are causally efficacious. In other words, something is a candidate for a real phys-
ical entity in contrast to a mere mathematical one if and only if it can be conceived as
being a causal power, that is, as being a disposition to produce certain effects. That
criterion applies to the interpretation of quantum physics independently of whether
or not one recognizes state reductions.
Since quantum entanglement is independent of spatio-temporal distance, the struc-
tures of entanglement can be regarded as being more fundamental than the metri-
cal structures of classical space-time. Indeed, important research in quantum gravity
takes the direction of treating classical space-time as not being fundamental (see e.g.
Kiefer [31], notably Chap. 10). But what then is fundamental and how does what is
physically fundamental distinguish itself from a mere mathematical entity? Again,
one can represent the quantum reality in an abstract and general manner in terms of
algebraic structures (see notably the algebraic representation of quantum field the-
ory, in particular Haag [30]). But algebraic structures are a tool to represent physical
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reality so that one still has to answer the question of what that physical reality thus
represented consists in and how real physical structures distinguish themselves from
their representation in terms of mathematical structures. In early modern philosophy
of nature, Leibniz objects to Descartes that the notion of spatio-temporal extension
is not fundamental and that instead the causal notion of force is more fundamental.
Leibniz hence defends a causal conception of matter. That conception still is the only
alternative available to the definition of physical reality in terms of localization in
space-time. The question of what the fundamental reality as represented by math-
ematical structures consists in hence leads to a general and powerful argument for
taking causation in the form of causal structures to be a fundamental physical fea-
ture.
5 Space-time and Causation
Let us briefly consider space-time itself as treated by general relativity theory. In
classical physics up to and including special relativity, space-time is conceived as
a passive background structure in which material objects and their properties are
embedded. However, general relativity theory abandons this conception of space-
time. According to general relativity theory, the metrical field contains itself energy,
namely the gravitational energy. Hence, general relativity theory excludes a dualism
between space-time as a passive background arena and matter as that what is inserted
into this arena. Space-time, as constituted by the metrical field, is itself a dynamical
entity and interacts with non-gravitational energy-matter as well as with itself.
Since the metrical field contains the gravitational energy, it can be conceived as a
material entity on a par with all the other physical fields. In this vein, one can regard
gravitation as a fundamental physical interaction on a par with the other fundamental
physical interactions—the fact that gravitation is universal and includes all physi-
cal objects notwithstanding (see in particular Rovelli [49, Sect. 4]). On this view, in
short, the fact that space-time is no passive background structure in general relativity
signifies that the spatio-temporal, gravitational structures are material structures as
well. On this basis, it is therefore possible to conceive the spatio-temporal, gravita-
tional relations as a causal structure as well: the metrical structures are the power or
disposition to produce the gravitational effects (see Bartels [5, pp. 37–38], Bartels
[6] and Bird [11, Sect. 2.3]; see Livanios [36] against this position—however, simply
pointing out the fact that the metrical structures are geometrical structures begs the
question, since they contain the gravitational energy).
One may envisage going even one step further: the programme known as causal
set theory provides for a precise mathematical model of how causal processes can
build up space-time itself (see in particular Sorkin [53] and Reid [48]). One can re-
ceive this programme as taking up Leibniz’ characterization of matter in terms of
points of force and employing this characterization in order to understand space-time
itself: according to causal set theory, causal elements locally produce further causal
elements, and these processes taken together constitute space-time (see Butterfield
[12, pp. 858–861], and Earman [18, Sects. 7 and 8], for a philosophical assessment).
However, the view of the metrical structures of space-time being causal structures is
not committed to the programme of causal set theory.
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6 Conclusion
In sum, we can say the following: nothing hinders one to conceive the fundamental
physical structures as causal structures. By contrast to what the tradition going back
to Russell [50] claims, it is not only possible to interpret today’s fundamental phys-
ical theories in a causal manner, but there are a number of arguments for doing so:
general philosophical arguments from the metaphysics of properties (see e.g. Shoe-
maker [52] and Bird [10]), the requirement to be able to distinguish real physical from
mere mathematical structures, and several concrete arguments in the interpretation of
quantum theory and the interpretation of general relativity theory.
These arguments drive us to an anti-empiricist ontology that rehabilitates the no-
tions of causation and causal properties in the domain of fundamental physics: we
have to countenance irreducible dispositions and consequently causal properties in
the fundamental physical realm, and at least if we do so in the framework of an
interpretation of quantum theory that admits state reductions, we are thereby also
committed to objective, single case probabilities in the form of propensities, and we
get a fundamental law that is time-reversal invariant, thus designating a direction of
time. There is as such nothing wrong with these commitments. The tradition of dog-
matic empiricism in the philosophy of science has been overcome since the 1960s,
and there are sound arguments available for each of these ontological commitments,
as indicated in this paper. These commitments bring fundamental science closer to
the special sciences such as biology as well as to common sense—at least in the
sense that the special sciences and common sense trade in dispositions, adopting a
realist attitude towards causation, and that the phenomena they consider are nearly
all not time-reversal invariant. But again, this is a welcome result, since fundamen-
tal science, the special sciences and common sense are all about one and the same
world. Note that the relative closeness to the special sciences and to common sense is
a result, and not a starting point or an argument for the claims defended in this paper.
The renewed interest in metaphysics in contemporary philosophy started with de-
scriptive metaphysics in the late 1950s (see e.g. Strawson [54]), which limited itself
to describing the ontological commitments of common sense, refusing to engage in
the project of revising these commitments. Today, a current known as metaphysics
of science belongs to the mainstream in philosophy of science, seeking to build a
vision of nature on the basis of our best scientific theories, thereby linking up with
the German tradition of Naturphilosophie. Metaphysics of science clearly engages in
a revision of the ontological commitments of common sense on the basis of science.
But it would certainly not be wrong-headed if this current could link up with descrip-
tive metaphysics in retaining some of its central commitments—such as the one to
dispositions and causation—, insofar as there are independent arguments available
for these commitments based on science.
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